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IS SECTION 1981 MODIFIED BY TITLE VII OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964?
In the past several years both the courts and the Congress have
become more involved in the black American's struggle for equality.
As part of this increased involvement, Congress passed the first
extensive civil rights legislation' in nearly one hundred years, and the
Supreme Court revitalized a major portion of Reconstruction
legislation. In Jones v. Alfred H Mayer Co., 2 the Court held that
section 1982 of title 42, a provision from the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 3 bars racial discrimination in the rental or sale of housing by
private parties. 4 The Court further found that the Fair Housing Title
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 did not repeal or otherwise affect the
vitality of section 1982. 5 Interpreting section 1981 of title 42, ap-
parently derived from the 1866 Act, the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works7 held that
although section 1981 prohibits private discrimination in
employment, it is modified by the Fair Employment Title of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. This note will examine the justification for.
holding that section 1981 has been modified by the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, while section 1982 has been held to be unaffected by similar
civil-rights legislation.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
Historical Background
Although President Lincoln said that the Civil War was a struggle
to preserve the Federal Union rather than an attempt to abolish
slavery,' clearly, the "fate of slavery was inextricably linked to the
outcome of the war." 9 The pressure upon Lincoln to make the
1. Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (Supp. V, 1970); Civil Rights Act of
1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1964).
2. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964). See note 26 infra and accompanying text.
4. 392 U.S. at 421. Some commentators have disagreed strongly with the Court's reasoning
in Jones. See, e.g., Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 S. CT. Rav.
89; The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 95-103 (1968).
5. 392 U.S. at 416-17.
6. See notes 82-86 infra and accompanying text.
7. 427 F.2d 476, 487 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Nov. 9, 1970).
8. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley, Aug. 22, 1862 [published in N.Y.
Tribune, Aug. 25, 1862].
9. See Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last, 55 VA. L. Rv.
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abolition of slavery the principal issue of the war resulted, to some
extent, in his issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation in
September of 1862.10 The Proclamation declared that slaves in the
seccessionist states would be "forever free."' 1
Once military victory was assured to the Union forces, doubts
arose concerning the viability of emancipation following the end of
hostilities. Congressional Republicans felt that action on their part
was necessary to assure a lasting abolition of slavery, and with this
consideration the thirteenth amendment was added to the
Constitution. 2 The thirteenth amendment provides that "[n]either
slavery nor involuntary servitude. . . shall exist . ,."' and grants
to Congress the power to enforce this provision by appropriate
legislation. Because of the obscurity of the origin of slavery and the
probability that the institution resulted from tradition and custom,
rather than specific legal provisions, the first section of the thirteenth
amendment prohibits the existence of slavery itself rather than the
laws which supported it. 4
After the conclusion of the Civil War, Congress, convinced that
black people were not actually enjoying equal rights under state
reconstruction governments,' 5 enacted a panoply of civil rights
legislation directed toward the permanent abolition of slavery and all
the incidents thereof. 1 The first act of the 39th Congress was to
272, 273 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Kohl]. See generally J. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY 99-133 (1964).
10. Koh1273.
11. T. WILLIAMS, ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SELECTED SPEECHES, MESSAGES, AND LETTERS 211
(1957). The Proclamation was to take effect Jan. 1, 1863. Id.
12. Kohl 273. The debate in Congress on the thirteenth amendment began in mid-March of
1864 and ended with the formal proposal of the amendment on January 31, 1865, just three
months before the surrender of General Lee at Appomattox. See generally CONG. GLOBE, 38th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1199 (1864), through CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 531 (1865).
13. U.S. CONsT. amend. XlII.
14. Kohl 279. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Bridges, 19 La. Ann. 234, 237 (1867), asserting that
"[S]lavery was never, strictly speaking, established in this country by positive law." See also I
J. HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 577 (1858), where it was
said: "[P]roperty in slaves does not rest upon positive statute, but upon unwritten law ..
15. Kohl 279.
16. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27; Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140; Act
of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433; Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335. The full text
of this legislation can be found in R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR
A SWORD 211-49 (1947). For the details of what happened to these acts, see, e.g., Substantive
Civil Rights Under Federal Legislation, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 133-61 (1958); Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323 (1952); Maslow &
Robison, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality 1869-1952,20 U. CHI. L. REV. 363
(1953).
1224 [Vol. 1970:1223
SECTION 1981 & TITLE VII
appoint a Joint Committee of Fifteen to "inquire into the condition of
the [seccessionist] States."'" Not until the Committee had submitted
its report were representatives from the southern states to be seated in
Congress.18
The findings and conclusions of the Committee, issued in early
1866, are highly germane to the determination of the evils which the
1866 Civil Rights Act was intended to remedy. While the South was
removing the legal disabilities of slavery, it was covertly undertaking
to reintroduce a new, privately enforced slave system.1 9 The
Committee carefully inquired of the many witnesses testifying before
it whether the freedman was, in fact, able to contract out his labor in a
free market and whether the southern white landowner would actually
sell property to blacks. 20 Although the Black Codes did not prohibit
Negro access to the land and labor markets, the Committee found
that access was extremely limited in practice. With respect to labor, it
found that some whites physically coerced freedmen into signing
employment contracts at substantially lower wages than those paid to
whites .2 These attempts by white southerners to deny the black man
17. REPORT OF THE JoiNT CoMMrrTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. at VII
(1866) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
18. Id.
19..Kohl 279-80. See, e.g., letter of Col. Samuel Thomas, Asst. Commissioner for
Mississippi and N.E. Louisiana, S. ExEc. Doc. No. 2, 39th Conk., ist Sess. at 82 (1865). Col.
Thomas wrote:
All the trickery, chicanery and political power possible are being brought to bear on the
poor negro, to make him do the hard labor for the whites, as in the days of old.
To this end the mass of people are instinctively working. They steadily refuse to sell or
lease lands to black men. Colored mechanics of this city, who have made several
thousand dollars during the last two years, find it impossible to buy even land enough to
put up a house on, yet white men can purchase any amount of land. The whites know that
if negroes are not allowed to acquire property or become landowners, they must
ultimately return to plantation labor, and work for wages that will barely support
themselves and families, and they feel that this kind of slavery will be better than none at
all.
20. See REPORT VII.
21. REPORT 11-55, 11-83. Wage fixing was so prevalent that General Terry ordered non-
enforcement of the Vagrant Act because:
In many counties of this State meetings of employers have been held, and unjust and
wrongful combinations have been entered into for the purpose of depressing the wages of
the freedmen below the real value of their labor, far below the prices formerly paid to
masters for labor performed by their slaves. . . .The effect of the statute in question will
be, therefore, to compel the freedmen, under penalty of punishment as criminals, to
accept and labor for the wages established by these combinations of employers. E.
MCPHERSON, POLMCAL MANUAL FOR 1866 at 42 (1866).
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his newly acquired rights demonstrated that the laissezfaire approach
of Congress toward the freedman was a failure.n
Provisions of the Act
To the 39th Congress, dominated by Radical Republicans, this
circumvention of the thirteenth amendment and denial of the newly
won rights of Negroes was intolerable. The Radicals reacted by
commencing Reconstruction with a vengeance,23 and the result was
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. In light of the facts brought to the
attention of Congress by the Committee of Fifteen and the radical
temper of the 39th Congress, it does not seem surprising that
Congress would enact legislation intending to prohibit all racially
motivated discrimination, public and private.
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided:
Be it enacted . . . that all persons born in the United States. . . are hereby
declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens of every race and
color, without regard to any -previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude . . shall have the same right, in every state and territory in the
United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 1
Section 1 was re-enacted in 1870 after ratification of the fourteenth
amendment and is apparently codified in two sections of title 42.2?
Section 1982, applied by the Supreme Court in Jones, provides:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.2
Its companion statute, section 1981, provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by
white citizens ....
22. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,449-80 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. Kohl283.
24. Act of April9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
25. See 392 U.S. at 442 n. 28; Young v. International Tel. &Tel. Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 2489 (3rd
Cir. Feb. 11, 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., - F.2d - (5th Cir.
197 1). But see Cook v. The Advertising Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 2413 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 1971).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964).
27. Id. § 1981.
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Interpretation
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,2 where the company refused to
sell a house to Jones because he was a Negro, the Supreme Court held
that section 1982 prohibits racial discrimination in the rental and sale
of housing by private parties. Based on Jones, it has been contended
that section 1981 is as applicable to private racial discrimination in
employment as section 1982 is applicable to such discrimination in
housing.29 The validity of this theory has been litigated several times
with conflicting results. 30 Most of the fundamental arguments
against the utilization of section 1981 against racial employment
discrimination are found in Harrison v. American Can Co.31 In that
case the district court suggested that it does not necessarily follow
from Jones that section 1981 applies to private racial discrimination
in employment since section 1981 was not intended to reach private
conduct, as was section 1982. Reference to the Jones decision appears
to dispell this notion, for in that case the Court emphasized that "the
structure of the 1866 Act as well as its language, points to the
conclusion . . . that § 1 [from which both sections 1981 and 1982
were apparently derived] was meant to prohibit all racially moti-
vated deprivations of the rights enumerated in the statute."3 2
The Harrison court also contended that the words "to make and
enforce contracts" in section 1981 do not clearly relate to
employment, while the language of section 1982 plainly applied to the
28. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
29. See Note, Racial Discrimination in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act ofl866, 36
U. Cm. L. REv. 616 (1969). See generally Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wisc.
L. REv. 470.
30. For those cases in which this theory was opposed, see, e.g., Harrison v. American Can
Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases I (S.D. Ala. 1969); Colbert v. H-K Corp., 295 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ga.
1968); Kendrick v. American Bakery Co., I F.E.P. Cases 349 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Norman v.
Missouri Pacific R.R., I F.E.P. Cases 331 (E.D. Ark. 1968), vacated and remanded, 414 F.2d
73 (8th Cir. 1969). All but the Harrison case rejected the 1981 claim because there was no state
action involved and no consideration was given to the possible ramifications of the Jones v.
Mayer decision. Cases in which the application of section 1981 was favored include Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 39 U.S.L.W. 3200 (Nov. 9, 1970);
Clark v. American Marine Corp., 304 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1969) (dictum); Dobbins v. Local
212, IBEW, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
31. 2 F.E.P. Cases I (S.D. Ala. 1969). See notes 82-86 infra, and accompanying text.
32. 392 U.S. at 426. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 422 F.2d 426, 482 (7th Cir.
1970). But see Cook v. The Advertiser Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 2413 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 1971).
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activity involved in Jones. However, as Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking
for the Court, pointed out in Jones:
The Congressional debates are replete with references to private injustices
against Negroes-references to White employers who refused to pay their
Negro workers, White planters who agreed among themselves not to hire freed
slaves without the permission of their former masters. . ...
Thus, it is apparent from the legislative history of the 1866 Act that
Congress sought to prohibit all racial discrimination whether or not
under color of law and that discrimination in employment was clearly
one of the evils Congress sought to correct. Moreover, the Court in
Jones34 expressly overruled Hodges v. United States ' which had
indicated that section 1981 did not apply to a conspiracy by private
individuals to interfere with a contract for employment.
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Four years before Jones and apparently without the knowledge
that section 1981 might be tilized to prevent private discrimination
in employment,36 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
enacted. Title VII was an attempt by Congress to deal
comprehensively with problems of equal employment opportunity.3 7
It was passed only after an arduous struggle against, and eventual
compromise with, powerful conservative forces in Congress who
succeeded in almost completely abrogating the strong enforcement
provisions originally proposed.u The Title applies to employers in an
33. 392 U.S. at 427. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.
1970); CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1160, 1833 (1860). See also 82 HARv. L. REV., supra
note 4, at 103 n.31.
34. 392 U.S. at 441.42 n.78.
35. 203 U.S. 1 (1906). In Hodges a group of white men had terrorized several Negroes to
prevent them from working in a sawmill. The terrorizers were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1964), of conspiring to prevent the Negroes from exercising the right to contract for
employment, a right secured to them by section 1981. The Supreme Court reversed the
conviction holding that only conduct which actually enslaves someone can be subjected to
punishment under legislation eacted to enforce the thirteenth amendment. Said the Jones court:
"The conclusion of the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of congressional power under
the thirteenth amendment irreconcilable ... and incompatible with the history and purpose of
the amendment itself." 392 U.S. at 441.43 n.78.
36. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was never mentioned in either the debates or committee
hearings concerning Title VII.
37. See, e.g., Vass, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. AND COm. L. REV. 431
(1966).
38. Id. In the House of Representatives for example, the bill was debated for 64 hours. 155
amendments were offered, and 34 were approved. Indeed, the Senate legislative deadlock
precipitated by the bill required the use of cloture to cut off debate-for only the [second time in
history]. 110 CONG. REc. 12860 (1964).
As originally drafted, Title VII was to have been administered by a federal agency empowered
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industry affecting interstate commerce which have 25 or more
employees;39 employment agencies, labor unions, and joint labor-
management committees which control apprenticeship and other
training programs are also covered .4 The statute is aimed at
employment discrimination based not only on race or color, but also
on sex, religion, or national origin.
Title VII, with strong emphasis on conciliation, created the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). This Commission
has the responsibility for receiving and investigating complaints filed
by "aggrieved persons" and attempting by means of "conference and
conciliation" to eliminate unlawful employment practices when it
determines that "reasonable cause" exists to believe that there has
been a violation of the Title.' Commission members have the power
to initiate unfair employment investigations whenever they have
reason to believe that the Act has been violated. If conciliation
attempts by the Commission are to no avail, enforcement devolves to
the aggrieved party who is then required to file a civil suit within 30
days or risk forfeiture of Title VII remedies 43 The Attorney General
of the United States also has the right to commence a suit on his own
initiative, if he has "reasonable cause to believe that any person or
groups of persons are engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance"
that would impair the full enjoyment of the rights enumerated in the
Title. " The Title also allows the Attorney General to intervene in
private civil actions when he certifies that the case is of general public
importance. 5
In summary, the statute provides three primary methods for
enforcement: conciliation by the EEOC; judicial enforcement through
private civil actions after conciliation has failed; and judicial
to eliminate discriminatory practices by cease and desist orders. See Berg, Equal Employment
Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62, 64-68 (1964). Due
to the strenuous opposition of many congressmen, the agency was stripped 6f its coercive powers
and relegated to the role of a mediator. Comment, The Civil Rights Act of 1964: Racial
Discrimination By Labor Unions, 41 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 58, 61 (1966). See also 110 CONG. REC.
13693 (1964).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964).
40. Id. § 2000e (cm(e).
41. Id. § 2000e-5(a).
42. Id.
43. Id. See Coleman, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Four Years of Procedural
Elucidation, 8 DuQ. L. Rav. 1 (1970).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1964).
45. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
Vol. 1970:1223] 1229
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
enforcement through "pattern and practice suits" brought by the
Attorney General.
TITLE VII AND SECTION 1982
Coverage
While there is, to be sure, a considerable duplication of coverage,
section 1981 and Title VII differ substantially in their methods of
enforcement and scope of application. In seeking to implement the
common objective of eliminating discrimination in employment, each
act reaches areas not affected by the other. Thus, protection against
employment discrimination under Title VII extends not only to black
people but to those individuals who may be denied employment
because they are, for example, Puerto Rican, American-Indian,
Jewish, persons of Italian or Eastern European ancestry, or members
of the fairer sex.4"
In addition, the Title makes the indication of any discriminatory
preference in advertising an unlawful employment practice.
Moreover, the EEOC and the Attorney General are permitted to take
positive action to eliminate employment discrimination. 7 Thus, a
major advantage of Title VII over section 1981 is that the Attorney
General has the power under the former to initiate suits on his own or
to intervene in private civil actions to help bring about compliance
with the Act.48 On the other hand, section 1981 has several apparent
advantages over Title VII. First, the expensive, time-consuming
procedural steps before the EEOC and state fair-employment
commissions, necessary under Title VII, would not be required in a
section 1981 action. 9 Second, under Title VI I, employers, unions, and
employment agencies are the only parties against whom an action can
be brought; under section 1981 it would be possible to expand the
scope of liability to include others who may interfere with the right
"to make and enforce contracts." 50 Third, while the 1964 Act
exempts federal, state, and local governments, government
corporations, and private membership clubs from compliance with its
46. Compare id. § 2000ewithid. § 1981.
47. Id. §§ 2000e-5(a), (e), -6(a).
48. Id. §§ 2000e-5(e), -6(a).
49. Under section 1981 the aggrieved party can seek relief directly from the courts.
Id. § 1343(e).
50. Liability of municipalities under section 1981 may be possible. But see Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961), finding no such liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
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provisions,5 section 1981 is not so limited. Fourth, section 1981
would not be limited to employers of twenty-five or more persons.
Fifth, the extremely short statute of limitations effective under Title
VII would not be controlling if the cause of action were based on
section 1981.52 Finally, the remedial scope of a section 1981 action
would be somewhat broader than that of Title VII; in addition to
injunctive relief, reinstatement, and an award of back pay under the
1964 Act, there would be the possibility of exemplary damages in an
appropriate section 1981 situation.0
Although Title VII's procedures have not been as cumbersome
and lengthy as some predicted and although, with minor exceptions,
the courts have adopted a relatively permissive attitude toward Title
VI I's formal requirements, holding most of the limitations in the
statute to be "directory" rather than "mandatory,"" meaningful and
effective relief under the Act is still a long process5 s
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1964).
52. Section 1981 provides no limitation period. In the absence of any express period, under
companion section 1983 courts have held that the period provided by the state statute for similar
actions applies. See O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914); Crawford v. Zeitler, 326 F.2d 119
(6th Cir. 1964); Horn v. Bailie, 309 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1962). Cf. Weiser v. Schwartz, 286 F.'
Supp. 389 (E.D. La. 1968), where it was held that federal law determines when the limitation
period begins to run. Moreover, in Jones the Court recognized, as support for allowing use of
section 1982, that if the statute of limitations of Title VIII applied-180 days-the case would
have had to be dismissed. 392 U.S. at 417-18 n. 21.
53. See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In that case the court held
that "[t]he existence of a statutory right implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate
remedies," id. at 239, even if the statute provides no explicit method of enforcement. The Court
noted that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1964), "created federal jurisdiction for 'damages or...
equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil
rights .... ' 396 U.S. at 238. Compensatory damages for the deprivation of a federal right
are governed by federal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1964) provides:
The jurisdiction in civil. . . matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of
this chapter. . . for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights,
and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of
the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all
cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary
to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court
having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not
inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and
govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause.
As the Court read section 1988, either federal or state rules on damages may be utilized,
depending on which better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes. It has also been
suggested that damages may be available under Title VII. See, e.g., 396 U.S. at 240. See Note,
Tort Remedies for Employment Discrimination Under Title VII, 54 VA. L. REv. 491 (1968).
54. See Coleman, supra note 43, at 29-31.
55. Id.
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Applicability of Section 1981
It has been suggested that the detailed and comprehensive nature
of Title VII compels adherence to the procedure outlined by Congress
and that any conflict between Title VII and section 1981 must be
resolved in favor of the former. Reference to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Jones is helpful in determining the validity of this
contention. In that case, the Court was faced with the problem of
reconciling section 1982 with the Fair Housing Title of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968. The Court emphasized that section 1982 is not a
comprehensive open-housing law but deals only with racial
discrimination and does not address itself to discrimination on
grounds of religion or national origin. 7 After enumerating the areas
which section 1982 does not cover and emphasizing that the section
contains none of the exemptions that Congress included in the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, the Court concluded that it would "be a serious
mistake to suppose that § 1982 in any way diminishes the significance
of [the Fair Housing Title of the 1968 Act]." 58 With section 1981 like
section 1982, applying only to racial discrimination and with the
employment title of the 1964 Act containing exemptions not included
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, it may be argued that Title VII does
not diminish the significance of section 198 1.
In the Jones opinion the Court further noted that Congress was
aware that Jones was pending before the Court and therefore foresaw
the significance of the eventual result. Yet, the 1968 Act does not
mention section 1982. 51 The Court thus concluded that it could not
assume a congressional intention to effect any procedural or
substantive change in the earlier statute. 0 Moreover, said the Court,
the Fair Housing Title of the 1968 Act contains a "savings" clause
which indicates that it was not intended to affect any other available
remedy-state or federal."
56. Harrison v. American Can Co., 2 F.E.P. Cases I (S.D. Ala. 1969).
57. Compare 392 U.S. at 412 with 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-06 (Supp. V 1970).
58. 392 U.S. at 415.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 416-17, n.20.
61. Id. at 417. The Savings clause reads:
Nothing in this title shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of a state or political
subdivision of a state, or of any other jurisdiction in which this title shall be effective, that
grants, guarantees, or protects the same rights as are granted by this title; but any law of
a state, a political subdivision, or other such jurisdiction that purports to require or
permit any action that would be a discriminatory housing practice under this title shall to
that extent be invalid. 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (Supp. V 1970).
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Although helpful by analogy, Jones does not resolve the problem
of the conflict between Title VII of the 1964 Act and section 198 1, for
the situation in Jones has been distinguished by at least two courts. In
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,62 the court suggested that section
1982 was unaffected by the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 because that Title contains a clause saving prior
legislation. Moreover, it was contended in Harrison v. American Can
Co." that while Congress knew of the pendency of Jones in 1968, it
still enacted Title VII of the 1968 Act and declared in the savings
clause that no limitation on any other law applicable to
discrimination in housing was intended. Both cases imply that the
lack of a similar savings clause in Title VII of the 1964 Act somehow
weighs against the applicability of section 1981. This seems an
erroneous suggestion for, as the Harrison opinion admits, 4 Congress
in 1964 could not forecast the judicial resurrection of the early Civil
Rights Act from oblivion four years later. Furthermore, both
Congress and the nation believed that in enacting Title VII in 1964,
employment discrimination by private parties was being placed under
federal statutory coverage for the first time. 5 Obviously, the presence
or absence of a savings clause in Title VII, written in 1964, when
Congress was unaware that a section 1981 cause of action existed, can
have no bearing on the issue of congressional intent with regard to
section 1981.
Procedural Requirements
A more serious question concerns the extent to which the
procedural requirements of Title VII restrict the viability of section
1981. In Harrison, the district court held that an aggrieved person
must pursue the lengthy procedure outlined in the 1964 Act before the
possibility of using section 1981 could be considered; to do anything
else, reasoned the court, would "in essence .. .declare a major
congressional enactment to have been an idle and unnecessary gesture
"66
However, in the more recent case of Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Works,17 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit faced the
62. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
63. 2 F.E.P. Cases I (S.D. Ala. 1969).
64. Id. at 3.
65. See, e.g., Vass, supra note 37.
66. 2 F.E.P. Cases at 3.
67. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
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conflict of section 1981 and Title VII head-on and developed what
might be termed a compromise solution. In an effort to reconcile the
two measures, the court held that section 1981 could be utilized but
that a plaintiff must first exhaust his Title VII administrative
remedies or provide a reasonable excuse for his failure to do so.
Whether an explanation is reasonable should be determined on a case-
by-case basis.68 Thus, in Waters, the plaintiffs were permitted to sue a'
labor union under section 1981 even though the union could not have
been sued under Title VII because the plaintiffs had failed to charge
the organization before the EEOC. The failure to follow Title VII
procedure was alleged to have been caused by the plaintiffs' lack of
knowledge of the union's complicity in company discrimination until
the short statute of limitations for bringing a Title VII action had
run.69
The defendants in Waters argued that the uniform and
comprehensive nature of Title VII strongly implied that Congress
intended the Act to be the sole vehicle for the attack on employment
discrimination and that pre-existing rights, such as those derived from
section 1981, were thus abolished. Dismissing this argument, the
Waters court concluded that the proper question, for purposes of
determining whether rights under section 1981 were repealed by
implication, should be: Does the legislative history demonstrate that
Congress would have intended repeal if it had been aware, of the pre-
existing rights available under the Civil Rights Act of 18667TO The
court surmised that, despite some indications to the contrary,
Congress would have modified the right of action under section 1981
if it had been cognizant of the early statute's existence and vitality.
Judge Swygert, speaking for the court, emphasized the procedural
framework of Title VII as a strong indication of congressional
preference for conciliation of disputes without resort to litigation.7
Although the Waters court presents a cogent argument for
retracting the scope of a section 1981 right when there is a conflict
with the conciliation procedures of Title VII, the court possibly
proceeded from an erroneous initial assumption. As the court stated
it, the question was whether Congress would have repealed section
1981 had it been aware of that statute's implications.. It might be
68. Id. at 485.
69. Id. at 487, n.20.
70. Id. at485.
71. Id. at 486.
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contended that the proper inquiry should be whether, and in what
form, Congress would have enacted Title VII. The enactment of Title
VII was the culmination of many years of strenuous efforts by civil
rights forces, both within Congress and without. Indeed' while
discrimination because of sex, religion, and national origin falls
within the purview of Title VII, the elimination of discrimination on
account of race was unquestionably the primary motivation behind its
enactment. Congressional civil rights advocates, who had fought a
long battle to enact legislation to ameliorate the condition of the
black working man, would not likely surrender such a potentially
potent weapon as section 1981 in exchange for Title VII, whose
broader scope is more than offset by its complicated procedure and
almost total lack of enforcement provisions. Had Congress been
aware of the existence of a section 1981 action, necessary votes could
probably not have been mustered to repeal or modify that statute.
Recognizing the improbability of repeal, it seems more plausible that
congressional forces which had favored conciliation over litigation
would have actively advocated the passage of Title VII as a
supplement to section 1981, thus salvaging, at least to some extent,
the conciliation approach to resolving employment discrimination
disputes.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc.72 sheds additional light on the resolution of the conflict
between section 1981 and Title VII. In that case the Court, citing
Jones, held that the "hierarchy of administrative machinery"'
provided by the public accommodations provisions of Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act "is not at war with survival of the principles
embodied in § 1982." 73 The same comment can be made about Title
VII and section 1981. Both Title VII of the 1964 Act and Title VI of
the same Act, litigated in Sullivan, contain similar procedures which
must be followed before an aggrieved party may contest
discriminatory practices in court.74 It seems likely that if the
"administrative machinery provided by Title VI is not at war with
survival of. . .§ 1982," the similar mechanism of Title VII can co-
exist with section 1981.
Moreover, Congress evidently did not see conciliation as
necessarily predominant on a- heirarchy of appropriate methods of
72. 396 U.S. 229 (1970).
73. Id. at 237.
74. Compare id. with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1964).
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enforcing equal opportunity in employment. For example, Congress
rejected by a more than two-to-one margin Senator Tower's
amendment that would have made Title VII the exclusive remedy for
employment discrimination.75 Accordingly, courts have held that Title
VII does not preempt National Labor Relations Board jurisdiction to
hear charges of unfair labor practices based on the union's duty of
fair representation. 6 In addition, Congress provided in another
section of Title VII for the imposition of appropriate state criminal
sanctions as a possible initial step against discriminators." In
providing for the enforcement of state fair-employment practices laws
in Title VII, Congress seemingly intended to encourage the utilization
of all weapons at the disposal of injured parties to aid the fight against
employment discrimination." Allowing section 1981 to be used to
fight employment discrimination as a complement to Title VII gives
full expression to this congressional intent.
CONCLUSION
Although Congress did, indeed, express a preference for
conciliation over litigation in Title VII, this preference falls far short
of meeting the stringent repeal by implication requirements set down
by the Supreme Court in cases where two statutes conflict. The Court
has held that when there are two acts upon the same subject, the rule is
to give effect to both if possible. "[I]t is not sufficient to establish that
subsequent laws cover some or even all of the cases provided for by
[the prior act]; for they may be merely affirmative, or cumulative, or
auxiliary."7 For repeal by implication, the Court requires "a positive
repugnancy between the provisions of the new law, and those of the
old; and even then the old law is repealed by implication only pro
tanto to the extent of repugnancy." ' 0
It is apparent that the existence of two different pieces of
legislation dealing in substantially different terms with employment
75. 110 CONG. REc. 13650-52 (1964).
76. E.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1964).
78. The Nixon administration has attempted to provide supplemental remedies to Title VII to
remove racially discriminatory employment practices. See 38 U.S.L.W. 2191 (Op. Att. Gen.,
Sept. 22, 1969).
79. Wood v. United States, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 342, 362-63 (1842).
80. United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198-99 (1939). See also Posados v. National
City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 504 (1936).
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discrimination is not an ideal situation. It is also undeniable that
some duplication of effort and confusion of obligations, rights, and
remedies will occur. Obviously, comprehensive legislation carefully
designed to eliminate inconsistencies, fill gaps, and clarify ambiguities
would be the best approach for Congress to take in combating
employment discrimination. Nevertheless, until such legislation is
enacted, it would seem only reasonable to utilize all available vehicles,
including both Title VII and section 1981, to attack such
discrimination. The most substantial obstacle to the utilization of
section 1981 is its conflict with the administrative procedure of Title
VII. The courts must carry the burden of resolving this conflict in
light of congressional intent in enacting both pieces of legislation-the
desire to eliminate racial discrimination and provide equal
employment opportunities for all. It would be well to remember that
in other areas where a strong desire to eliminate racial discrimination
is evident, the Supreme Court has said that the Court has not merely
the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible
eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like
discrimination in the future."1
Recently the contention has been made that section 1981 was
derived from section 16 of the Enforcement Act of 1870, rather than
section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. s The significance of this is
that section 16 was enacted solely to insure that aliens would receive
the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment, and thus the "state action" limitation of the fourteenth amend-
ment would bar the use of that section in private discrimination cases.
Support for such a theory is found in the codifiers' historical note
under section 1981 and in study of the congressional debates over
section 16.Y3
81. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), invalidating interpretation and
citizenship tests in voting. Accord, Gaston County v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969),
invalidating a discriminatory literacy test for voting.
82. See Cook v. The Advertiser Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 2413 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 15, 1971). But see
Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 39 U.S.L.W. 2489 (3d Cir. Feb. 11, 197 1); Boudreaux v.
Baton Rouge Marine Contracting Co., - F.2d - (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court will
have the opportunity to resolve this conflict as petition for certiorari has been filed in a private
employment discrimination case involving section 1981. Dobbs House, Inc. v. Sanders, 431
F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), petition for cert. filed, 39 U.S.L.W. 2413 (U.S. Feb. 3, 1971) (No.
1079).
83. See. e.g.. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3871 (1870).
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If it is concluded that section 1981 was derived from the 1870
Act, what is the status of that portion of the 1866 Act from which
section 16 was derived? In 1874 the United States Statutes at Large
were codified. Because the codifiers were required to include in the
Revised Statutes those acts which were "general and permanent in
nature," ' 4 a category which certainly'would include section I of the
1866 Act, it seems likely that the omission of part of the 1866 Act
was an error in codification. 5 A possible explanation for the
codifiers' error is that they were confronted with two almost identical
statutes, section 1 of the 1866 Act and section 16 of the 1870 Act. On
its face section 16 appears to be slightly broader, as its coverage
extends to "all persons" rather than only to "citizens," and thus the
codifiers might have reasoned that by including in the codification
what appeared to be the broader provision, the inclusion of the almost
identical provisions of the 1866 Act would be superfluous."4 Thus,
section 1981 seems to have been read by the courts as if both the
pertinent portion of the 1866 Act and section 16 of the 1870 Act were
subsumed therein." Such a dual interpretation of section 1981 gives
force to the intent of Congress that the Revised Statutes should
include "all statutes. . . general and permanent in their nature." 88
84. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74.
85. Furthermore, it seems absurd to contend that such a controversial piece of legislation
would have been -repealed without congressional comment.
86. Following this reasoning, the repealer contained in the Revised Statutes which expressly
does not repeal acts "general and permanent in their nature" would not have repealed the
pertinent section of the 1866 Act. REVISED STATTrrEs ch. 74, § 5596 (1878).
87. Compare Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 30-31 n.7 (1948), and United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 695-96 (1898) (which treat section 1981 as an reenactment of section
16 of the 1870 Act), with Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441-43 n.78 (1968)
(which considers section 1981 to be derived from the 1866 Act).
88. Act of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74.
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